IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA EASTERN DIVISION

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INTERVARSITY CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP/USA, :

INTERVARSITY CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP/USA, INTERVARSITY GRADUATE CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP,

Plaintiffs,

vs. : Case No. 3:18-cv-00080

THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA; BRUCE HARRELD, in his official capacity as President of the University of Iowa and in his individual capacity; MELISSA S. SHIVERS,: in her official capacity as Vice President for Student Life and in her individual capacity; WILLIAM R. NELSON, : in his official capacity as Associate Dean of Student Organizations and in his individual capacity; ANDREW KUTCHER,: in his official capacity as Coordinator : for Student Organization Development and in his individual capacity; and THOMAS R. BAKER, in his official capacity as Student Misconduct and Title IX Investigator and in his individual capacity,

Defendants.

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HEARING TRANSCRIPT

Judge's Chambers, First Floor U.S. Courthouse 123 East Walnut Street Des Moines, Iowa Wednesday, September 25, 2019 2:58 p.m.

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE STEPHANIE M. ROSE, Judge.

KELLI M. MULCAHY, CSR, RDR, CRR United States Courthouse 123 East Walnut Street, Room 115 Des Moines, Iowa 50309

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: DANIEL H. BLOMBERG, ESQ.

(Via telephone) ERIC S. BAXTER, ESQ.

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For the Defendant: (Via telephone)

GEORGE A. CARROLL, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General Hoover State Office Building 1305 East Walnut, Second Floor

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Also Present: (Via telephone)

NATHAN LEVIN

PROCEEDINGS

(In chambers, with counsel appearing via telephone.)

THE COURT: Okay. Then we are here for purposes of hearing oral argument regarding the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment filed at Dockets 21 and 51 in the matter of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship vs. The University of Iowa.

It's Case No. 3:18-cv-80.

We are joined on behalf of InterVarsity by Mr. Baxter, Eric Baxter, and by Mr. Blomberg.

Did I get that right?

MR. BAXTER: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. BLOMBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And we're joined on behalf of the University of Iowa by George Carroll.

Is anybody else on the line?

(No response.)

THE COURT: Okay. As the parties know, yesterday afternoon I sent some questions to the parties that I was hoping the parties would address today during the oral arguments. As the questions indicated -- or the e-mail indicated, I've given each party 30 minutes to argue your respective motions. You can use as much of that for rebuttal as you would like.

At this point, I will ask the plaintiffs to argue your motion first. And who will be arguing that on behalf of

25 | InterVarsity?

MR. BAXTER: Mr. Blomberg will be arguing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Blomberg, go ahead.

MR. BLOMBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court. I represent the plaintiffs, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/U.S.A. and InterVarsity's chapter at the university.

The University makes no attempt to distinguish this Court's ruling in BLinC and instead ignores the ruling and repeats the same arguments this Court already rejected and on a record that is even now less favorable to them.

But not only was the ruling in BLinC correct, but recent case law, notably the *Telescope Media* and *Wayne State* cases, support the BLinC ruling's holding. So we believe this Court should, at a minimum, reaffirm its BLinC ruling on the merits of the free speech, association, and exercise claims, and enter declaratory judgment and grant nominal damages.

Your Honor, I think that leaves three primary issues; the qualified immunity issue, appropriate relief, and the religion clauses claims. And we believe the Court -- I'd like to start by answering the questions that the Court sent over yesterday and then segue back into those three issues with the remaining time. And I'll shoot to save about five minutes for rebuttal.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. BLOMBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

So the first question that Your Honor raised was the issue of liability for Dr. Baker and President Harreld. Plaintiffs'

position is that the record for Dr. Baker does not currently reflect sufficient evidence of his involvement in InterVarsity's deregistration for him to be found liable for purposes of the plaintiffs' motion for a partial summary judgment.

For purposes of President Harreld, we believe the record is sufficient to show that he is liable for his actions as a supervisor because he was aware of the unconstitutional actions of his subordinates and that he failed to correct them.

Wagner vs. Jones, 664 F.3d at 275. It's a 2011 Eighth Circuit case that establishes a supervisor is liable under Section 1983 where the supervisor is aware of substantial risk of serious constitutional harm and fails to exercise his authority to prevent it and instead turns a blind eye.

We think the record here reflects, at IVCF app pages 2397 through 2407, that President Harreld was aware that his subordinates were deregistering BLinC, that this Court had enjoined that deregistration in January 2018, and he discussed that decision with Defendant Shivers.

He was aware that his subordinates then planned to deregister InterVarsity and other student groups, and he was aware that his subordinates did, in fact, do so, and he never countermanded any of these decisions when he had the opportunity to do that. We think that provides sufficient basis for his liability under Section 1983.

As regards the InterVarsity U.S.A. standing, the Court's second question to the plaintiffs, we think that because InterVarsity Graduate clearly has standing in the same way that BLinC did, no further inquiry is necessary under *Jones vs. Gale*. That's 470 F.3d at 1265.

However, we also think that InterVarsity USA has standing for injuries that it has directly suffered and for which it still seeks relief and has incurred over \$4,000 in damages and diverted staff time to get its chapter re-registered.

The University's actions harmed its mission of providing on-campus ministry at the University, which it had been doing for over 25 years. The national chapter has a direct and inextricable link with InterVarsity Graduate so that the deregistration of a chapter and the attendant harms that came from that were also harms directly to InterVarsity USA.

And this link between the two organizations is reflected both in the chapter's constitution and in the University's own policies. So just to look at the InterVarsity constitution at app pages 1995 through 1998, it reflects that the chapter identifies itself as a chapter of InterVarsity USA, it sets a paid InterVarsity USA staff member as the official advisor of the group with duties to provide leadership and spiritual care as well as input into the leadership and membership of the organization.

It requires all student leaders to agree with InterVarsity

USA's statement of faith. It forbids changing certain elements of the constitution that relate to InterVarsity's religious beliefs at any time for any reason.

It requires that any constitutional amendments of any kind have to be filed with an InterVarsity USA staff member in order to be valid, and it requires that any funds that aren't University funds that are in the chapter's possession at the time of dissolution be distributed to InterVarsity USA.

Also, University policy requires that RSOs, registered student organizations, like the chapter must observe national organization policies as a condition of keeping their registered status so the University policy requires that relationship between the two organizations because of their -- the national organization's relationship there.

It also requires -- the policy only permits an advisor of the kind that InterVarsity Graduate has if they are a liaison to a national organization with which the registered student organization has an official affiliation. And that language is at InterVarsity app 0371, and the policies that I was referring to are the discipline of registered student organizations policy, section 1, sub 5, and the registration of student organizations policy at section 6, sub 1.

We think InterVarsity also has associational standing to assert the rights of InterVarsity Graduate and other InterVarsity chapters. We don't think this Court needs to reach

that because InterVarsity is asserting its own injuries as well.

Your Honor, the third question that this Court asked was whether it needed to reach -- make more than one clearly established determination for purposes of qualified immunity. We think the answer to that is no.

We think that if this Court finds that there were multiple constitutional violations by specific defendants and determines that at least one of those violations was of clearly established law, then the plaintiffs do not think that, for purposes of this motion, the Court must take the next step to reach whether the other violations were also of clearly established law.

The damages and the claims here all spring from the same operative nexus of facts, and so purposes -- for purposes of damages, finding liability under, say, the free speech claim will also provide relief for the free exercise claim.

Your Honor, I think those are the questions that the Court asked the plaintiffs to address. If the Court doesn't have any other questions, I will turn to the qualified immunity analysis.

THE COURT: I do not. Thank you. Go ahead.

MR. BLOMBERG: Your Honor, I think the primary question in light of this Court's ruling in BLinC is not whether there was a constitutional violation but, rather, whether the law was sufficiently clear that the University -- from University officials to know their actions violated constitutional rights. I believe the answer is yes.

In BLinC, this Court found the case -- the issue of qualified immunity was a close call, but this case isn't a close call for two primary reasons.

First, before the start of this lawsuit, this Court twice enjoined the University's uneven enforcement of its nondiscrimination policy for violating the free speech clause. And while those rulings were preliminary because the facts were undeveloped, the law was clear selective unenforcement -- or selective enforcement was forbidden as established by a long line of Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit cases going back decades.

And especially under the Eighth Circuit's broad view of the clearly established standard, that was more than enough guidance for a reasonable official to know that they should stop selective enforcement.

Here, the University officials testified that they understood that this Court's rulings meant exactly that, that they could not selectively enforce their policy against a religious organization, and yet those same officials admitted that that's exactly what they did.

They enforced their nondiscrimination policy against

InterVarsity and deliberately exempted other groups from the

policy; not one group, not two groups, but many exceptions to

its policy for multiple groups, including Hawkapellas, Women in

Science and Engineering, Love Works, and Iowa Edge, as well as

House of Lorde. And that's reflected at Statement of Facts 280 through 283, paragraphs 280 to 283, and also 315 to 316, among other places.

And the University can't just claim that it was trying to comply with the order in BLinC because that order enjoined discriminatory enforcement against a religious group. And so the University admitted that it actually continued discriminatory enforcement against a religious group, and this time, instead of being BLinC, it was against InterVarsity.

Now, the University suggests the nature of the forum, being a university, and being the issue of leadership selection, makes the law unclear, but the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly said the nature of the forum is irrelevant when it comes to issues of viewpoint discrimination. The Court said that in Gerlich, it said that in CEF vs. Minneapolis School District, it said it in Burnham. And that's because viewpoint discrimination is forbidden in all forums.

And that's why Gerlich's controlling framing of the issue of how to determine whether viewpoint discrimination on a university is fairly straightforward. The court said the question here is whether the plaintiff's right not to be subject to viewpoint discrimination when speaking in a university's limited public forum was clearly established.

That's also why Judge Kelly's concurrence in *Gerlich* went through controlling Eighth Circuit case law, explained why the

First Amendment's application was just as clear and just as established in the university setting as it was anywhere else.

And it's also probably why the University, on appeal in the Eighth Circuit case with BLinC, is trying to push back on *Gerlich* and says that it actually comes, quote, precariously close, end quote, to being wrong. And that's their brief at pages 43 through 44.

So, Your Honor, we think that this Court's ruling made it particularly clear that the University couldn't do to InterVarsity what it had just done to BLinC. In fact, you know, if they tried to do the same thing to BLinC, it ran the risk of being held in contempt. You can't turn around and go after another religious group while exempting other secular groups.

We think the nature of the violation is the second reason why we think qualified immunity makes it not as close in this case as it was found to be in BLinC. We think the nature of the violation was clear here.

The University admits that it deregistered InterVarsity solely for the religious content of its leadership policies, despite having permitted it to have those policies for 25 years.

It admitted that InterVarsity's belief requirement, if they had been -- I'm sorry -- admitted that if InterVarsity's belief requirement had been grounded in secular views, then this would have been permissible, but because they were religious, they were banned.

So a group's views about poverty alleviation that were secular in nature were permissible; a religious group's views about poverty alleviation that were religious, such as perhaps the parable of the Good Samaritan, were not permissible.

By the same token, a group such as many of the groups that are found in the record that require students to hold a view of human dignity as a requirement for being a part of the group or a leader within the group, a religious group couldn't make that same requirement and ground it in the religious concept of the image dei, the image of God in every human person.

Your Honor, that's textbook viewpoint discrimination.

Rosenberger, Good News Club, Lamb's Chapel, all of them said that when the Government tries to exclude religious views on otherwise permissible subjects, it commits viewpoint discrimination. Frankly, it couldn't be any clearer on that point.

And what makes it particularly clear here is that this particular type of viewpoint violation is a poison pill for religious groups. At Statement of Facts 318 through 321, the University basically admitted that when it admitted that a ban — that its ban on religious groups having religious leaders fundamentally undermined the religious group's mission and message, which is part of the reason why it didn't apply to other groups. And we'll get to that in just a second.

But it's also part of the reason why major

anti-discrimination laws, like Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, specifically exempts religious groups from the religious nondiscrimination requirement, because if you apply that requirement to a religious group, then you're cutting to the very heart of their organization.

Your Honor, the final reason why the nature of the violation was so clear here is that it was unnecessary. The record shows the University admitted it had no reason why it could accommodate Love Works but not InterVarsity. That's at Statement of Facts 322.

It also admitted that it had no evidence demonstrating that an accommodation for InterVarsity would harm its interest in any significant way. That's at Statement of Facts 311.

It didn't attempt to even study the question before it forced InterVarsity off campus, even though it allowed InterVarsity to be registered for 25 years and even though it knew that Iowa State had another policy that allowed groups like InterVarsity to select their leaders.

So it made no attempt to make that kind of determination before it waded into this very sensitive First Amendment issue, and that's particularly egregious here because, once again, the University did decide to favor other religious groups and secular groups because applying the policy to them would harm their missions.

So this is what you see at App 384, where University

officials were weighing the imposition of, say, an all-comers
policy with the harm it would have to a men's glee club or the
Women in Engineering; and at paragraphs 315 and '17 of the
Statement of Facts, which showed the exemptions for Love Works
and House of Lorde were provided in part because otherwise
applying the policy to them would have undermined their
missions.

So the University admitted that it was just willing to accept harm that came from, for instance, a political/ideological group but not from a religious group. That's at Statement of Facts 303.

So, Your Honor, we think that qualified immunity is clearly not applicable here for purposes -- for both of the reasons; because of this Court's order that applied the longstanding case law and because the nature of the violation was significantly different.

Your Honor, I'd like to -- if there are no other questions -- no questions on that, I'd like to turn to the issue of relief.

The University argues that SF 274 moots the request for injunctive relief. Your Honor, we think that cannot be correct here because since the passage -- after the passage of SF 274, the University has continued to vigorously defend the constitutionality of its policy and to argue that federal law compels its policy. And a controlling case law says in those

kind of circumstances, that still leaves the plaintiffs with a need for federal relief.

So if you look at the defendants' supplemental brief,

Docket 50, where it repeatedly says -- the whole brief is an

argument that their policy is constitutional and that

InterVarsity's policy is discriminatory and impermissible on

campus.

And then their summary judgment brief at page 9 and their supplemental brief at pages 6 and 16, they say that they have a duty to ensure and enforce federal civil rights law, and they say that, quote, InterVarsity's sincere religious beliefs, end quote, regarding religious leadership selection are, quote, in direct conflict with federal civil rights law.

Your Honor, they've also made this argument before the Eighth Circuit in the BLinC appeal, where their response brief at page 45, and this is filed in early July, says that they were -- their position was grounded in federal nondiscrimination laws as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

So given their arguments that federal law compels their position, and those are consistent arguments they've taken for years now and continue to take after the passage of SF 274, that leaves them the ability to revert back to the original policy of excluding religious organizations, and that's what the *Trinity Lutheran* case said was impermissible and why it required the

court to still issue injunctive relief.

So we think that that's appropriate here as well, that the Court should issue injunctive relief because of the University's position on what the controlling law is. Obviously, federal law -- if federal law conflicts with state law, federal law is going to trump.

Your Honor, that brings me to the last issue, the religion clauses claims.

Just one moment.

Thank you, Your Honor. Just taking a sip of water there.

Your Honor, the religion clauses stand for the proposition, as the *InterVarsity* case in the Sixth Circuit states, that government cannot dictate to a religious organization who its spiritual leaders would be. And here, all three elements of a religion clause claim are undisputed.

First, undisputed that InterVarsity is a religious ministry; second, it's undisputed that the positions at issue are religious leadership positions that perform significant duties and sensitive duties that relate to religious teaching, religious worship, religious prayer; and, third, it's undisputed that the government — the University's position here goes right to the heart of the religious organization by requiring them to stop asking that the people who lead them in worship and prayer and religious teaching actually believe the things that they're saying.

In fact, the Walker case says that there's no clearer example of an intrusion on the internal affairs of religious organizations, something like this, because the group would cease to exist if it had to comply with it.

The University's counterargument here, Your Honor, boils down to the assertion that the Government can condition access to a traditional -- limit the public forum based on a private religious group's agreement to give up the religion clauses rights, including structural limits on non-entanglement.

And most obviously, Your Honor, the problem with this argument is that would apply in a variety of other contexts, including to limit the public forums that routinely rent space to churches, such as schools, community centers, and fairgrounds, allowing them to condition access to those limited public forums on the churches giving up their ability to assert religion clause claims, including their ability to decline to accept those schools' or community centers' or fairgrounds' nondiscrimination policies that would prevent them from hiring, say, an atheist pastor.

Your Honor, we point the Court to the *InterVarsity vs.*Wayne State decision that came down late last week, 2019 Westlaw 4573800, we filed it earlier today as supplemental authority, that refused to reject as a matter of law the religious clauses claims.

Your Honor, the final point on this issue, I'd just like to

note that this is not a particularly challenging application of the doctrine in the sense that churches clearly fit within this forum. The defendants here have admitted that there is an actual church that operates within this forum, that student groups are permitted to operate as a functional equivalent of a church. And, in fact, the Newman Center holds weekly Masses. That's at Statement of Facts paragraphs 32, 132, and 137.

And the leadership activities here are actually much more religious and much more wholly religious than you would typically find in a ministerial exception-type case where an employee might have duties of a variety of different natures. Here the record shows that these students have an almost complete commitment of their time on behalf of InterVarsity to religious activities.

And finally, Your Honor, I think just worth pointing out that the resolution on religion clauses grounds is actually a good bit narrower than other potential grounds, including, in part, because the University doesn't dispute any of the major criteria for -- any of the three criteria for finding religion clause claims.

Ruling in favor of InterVarsity in this instance

doesn't -- wouldn't require ruling that the same would be true

for every group; it would just apply to a religious group. It

doesn't apply to every position; it just applies to ministerial

positions. It doesn't apply to every form of governmental

interference, though it certainly would here. The interference is at its height.

And so, Your Honor, with that, I'd like to reserve the balance of my time for rebuttal.

THE COURT: Thank you. And you still have 8 minutes left.

Mr. Carroll.

MR. CARROLL: Oh, yes, Your Honor.

I'll start with -- I will start with two things. I'm at home today. I cut my foot last night doing yardwork. So you may hear dogs bark, so I apologize for that.

I'm going to respond to the questions I was posed. So did we file a response to the first supplemental statement of material facts? We didn't because they were quoting deposition testimony, and I understand under the local rules that they're deemed admitted because -- their quotes were accurate so there was no reason to, like, deny them.

The second question, are the individual defendants asserting qualified immunity, the qualified immunity doesn't apply to declaratory and injunctive relief, but it clearly applies to individual relief and no money damages. At some point, if the Court decided, the Court could enjoin the entity, the University of Iowa.

And the third question is kind of the -- well, the basis of the qualified immunity argument, and I will get to that in a

moment.

So when we look at what InterVarsity filed, you know, I mean -- and I know, Your Honor, you have both cases. So BLinC's on appeal to the Eighth Circuit, but the fact of the matter is they're different cases.

And after the BLinC ruling, the University of Iowa said, okay, we're going to look at all these groups and we're going to determine whether they're in compliance with the University's human rights policy, and if not, we're going to say, hey, please try to -- you know, please get in compliance. And at some point, InterVarsity said, well, we're just not going to. And that's fine from that point of view.

But it wasn't -- you know, part of the BLinC thing was that it was a student-complaint-driven process. This was a thorough review to ask these groups, if you want public forum access, if you want any kind of, essentially, public funding, then we need you to be in compliance with the Iowa human rights policy. And InterVarsity initially kind of agreed, and then they said, no. And that's fine. I mean, I'm not going to dispute that.

But all groups, the record is clear all groups were reviewed under the same standard after the BLinC ruling: Do you have this or not? And if not, why not?

And then if you look at -- and it hasn't been completely codified yet -- Senate File 274, I mean, because we don't have an official cite yet, you know, the Iowa legislature passed a

law saying you can't -- universities can't exclude leadership based on certain grounds. So that's where the mootness argument comes in. The argument that part of this case isn't moot is incorrect because it is moot.

Right now all religious groups are on hold, and somehow

InterVarsity has turned this to, oh, you're targeting them

again. It's exact opposite, Your Honor. We're saying, you

know, we got to resolve BLinC and we got to figure, well,

obviously, InterVarsity, so we're just going to essentially

leave you alone, and but we've done with the other groups -- the

same with other groups.

I mean, they keep bringing up athletics and music clubs. I mean, that's not the issue here. And, you know, we put them on hold, honestly, to be helpful, to say, okay, let's just weigh this out, and we'll figure something out, and at the end of the day, whatever day that is, then here's what is gonna happen.

And so when they say we punished InterVarsity, it wasn't that way at all. It was the opposite. I mean, the University went through all the constitutions and said please, you know, be in compliance, and they -- and they didn't.

And other groups, I mean, the record shows that other groups weren't in compliance. I mean, some didn't even submit a constitution, so that was simple, but other groups, I mean, just flat-out refused.

And so to say we targeted InterVarsity after the BLinC

ruling is just absolutely incorrect. I mean, it was an absolute

act of good faith to say we'll just put InterVarsity on hold

with the other religious groups. Well, now what I just heard

this afternoon, it's like we targeted -- Iowa targeted

InterVarsity, and that's not true, and the record doesn't

demonstrate that.

Now, moving on to kind of the more of my -- my cross-motion for summary judgment.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CARROLL: I don't know if you call it cross-motion. But on qualified immunity, I mean, the law isn't clearly established. We have cited multiple cases to say if you hold -- and actually, Mr. Blomberg was incorrect, it's not Dr. Baker -- if you hold university officials to understand the First Amendment and the establishment clause and then the equal protection clause, I mean, that's a tremendously difficult standard.

And, you know, as these cases kind of merge, the Court -and Mr. Blomberg was correct, you said this was a close call on
qualified immunity, but at the same time, it's how are these
individuals to know. I mean, I don't understand how lawyers
today and the U.S. Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit can
still issue decisions and talk about law and we expect what I'll
call lay people to understand what the law is.

I mean, there are some things that are so clearly

established, yes. You can't bust in somebody's home and arrest somebody without an arrest warrant or an emergency. I mean, there are certain things that are so clear.

But to understand the First Amendment, for people that it's not what they do every day -- and it doesn't matter if they talked to lawyers about it because every case is different. I mean, Mr. Blomberg, you know, cited the *Gerlich* case from Iowa State. But that case, that was a very close case. In fact, en banc was denied six-six, okay? So, I mean, it wasn't like this is so clear.

Now, the decision itself stands, I understand it completely, but it wasn't like -- if it's not clear to six judges on the Eighth Circuit, then I don't understand how it would be clear to people that don't do this for a living. And I'm not criticizing any federal judge in no manner, it's just that that isn't what they do every day. They run universities.

And, I mean, in this case, everybody -- I mean, all of the -- InterVarsity came after BLinC. Everybody was thinking this is the best way to approach it; not going after the religious claims, not going after whoever their ministers are, just minimally saying, you know, we think you need to be in compliance.

And, you know, if you lose qualified immunity on that, then you don't have it. I mean, you'll never have -- you know, I mean, I think qualified immunity is going to go out the door

because it's like I'm supposed to not only understand the law,

I'm supposed to understand how a judge at some level -- district

court, appellate court, U.S. Supreme Court -- is going to rule.

And I don't understand how people that that isn't what they do

for a living should understand that. You know, I mean, that is

the essence of our argument.

And then on the -- I'm going to move to the other parts. I think, hopefully, I've answered your questions.

THE COURT: Before we move on, Mr. Carroll, with respect to your argument that people who don't deal with the First Amendment every day, that this is not their job, cannot be expected to understand and avoid violating somebody's First Amendment rights, isn't that why something as clear as my order in BLinC is important?

This is the same university, the exact same policy, the exact same lawyers involved in it, including you, the same University of Iowa people who are responsible for enforcing or not enforcing it. And what I said to you very clearly, what I said to the University of Iowa, and what in their depositions all these responsible people said they understood, was that that human rights policy could not be selectively enforced.

Let's call that X. I told you not to do X.

MR. CARROLL: Okay.

THE COURT: The next thing you did was double X. You not only went after the BLinC-type people, but you went after

all religious people, which is worse than what you did in BLinC, in my opinion.

So how do you say we didn't know what to do when I told you exactly what to do and you did the opposite of that? Give me your best take on why that isn't a huge problem for you in this case.

MR. CARROLL: Okay. You -- I am not the defendant, so -- when you say said "you." But when you said it looked like selective enforcement -- and actually, Your Honor, you disagreed with the complaint-driven process. When I explained -- and, I mean, I understand your ruling. When you said you don't think this letter from BLinC was a complaint, and I said, well, no, but you didn't accept that argument.

In this case, after the BLinC ruling, we didn't just go after one group. It was all groups that were reviewed.

THE COURT: But you have just said that you put on hold in good faith, quote, for their own good, quote, all of the religious groups. And I know from reading the depositions that that's where you started this review process was with the religious groups.

I don't think you understand free expression and viewpoint discrimination when you draw a line between religion and other groups that articulate other things. I don't think, perhaps, you yourself understand the problem there. And that is very concerning to me because that is exactly what we're talking

about.

The University of Iowa may not selectively go after student groups based on what they think, based on what they advocate, whether it's religious or otherwise, unless you're going to do it evenly, equally. That means you cannot carve out a particular type of group and put them on hold for their own good. That's ludicrous to those of us who understand this law well.

And it's incredibly baffling, in light of the ruling I made, that the University would make that choice, and so I'm trying to understand why you would make that choice when it is so clearly a problem, in my view. Can you help me with that?

MR. CARROLL: Well, the choice was made just to try to -- groups designate if they're religious or not, okay? And some groups, you honestly -- you wouldn't know if they're holding religious beliefs. The carve-out was they clearly have asserted a statement of faith. Those groups were put on hold after the BLinC ruling. We weren't suppressing anything they were doing.

And the other groups were reviewed. They were reviewed equally. It was just to try to carve out and point out to the Court that we've put these on hold because of BLinC. They're not being targeted here. It's just a matter -- honestly, it's a matter of formatting. I mean, we could have done it alphabetical.

1 THE COURT: Explain to me what you mean by put them "on hold." What did that, in practical terms, mean for these 2 3 organizations? MR. CARROLL: It meant that, because of the BLinC 4 ruling, every group was reviewed on an equal basis, and then the 5 ones that weren't in compliance -- and there's non-religious 6 7 groups in that noncompliance. The non-religious groups were also told, no, you have to be in compliance with the Iowa human 8 rights policy. 10 We put the religious groups on hold only because of the BLinC ruling, so maybe we favored them over the other groups. 11 12 THE COURT: What do you mean you put them on hold? 13 you deregistered them? 14 MR. CARROLL: No. No. I mean, InterVarsity was 15 deregistered and then put on hold so -- I mean, they were at the 16 recruitment fair this fall, so we just put it on hold to review 17 the human rights policy. I mean, we reviewed the human rights policy. We said let's let this play out, and we're going to see 18 19 how -- you know, what happens. But they weren't --20 MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, I don't mean --MR. CARROLL: -- disfavored. 21 22 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Hold on just a minute. Who just interjected? 23

MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, this is -- my name Nathan

I'm in-house counsel for the University of Iowa.

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Levin.

think I may be able to provide some quick clarification on what George is referring to as put "on hold."

Put "on hold" was a term that he has used to indicate that we have kept all of our religious forums in good standing and have not taken away any benefits or privileges of those groups due to the pending litigation and appeal of BLinC and of InterVarsity.

So "on hold," as could -- I totally understand could sound to appear as if they're on hold, they've been deregistered or they've taken benefits away, but that's entirely not the case; put "on hold" meaning we are not going to apply the civil rights/human rights policy and review that and deregister them if they don't have the right requisite language in it. And so they have been all put in good standing until final resolution of the BLinC case and/or the InterVarsity case.

THE COURT: I thought --

MR. LEVIN: And with that I'll back out.

THE COURT: -- InterVarsity was threatened with deregistration and was ultimately deregistered. Am I wrong about that?

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, this is George. Initially they were, but they were put back in good standing, and they stand in good standing as we speak. I mean, they're on campus. They have a -- I mean, they actually don't have a university sponsor, but --

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              THE COURT: Okay. So how long were they deregistered?
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              MR. CARROLL: Oh, Eric or Dan, you might know.
 3
         Maybe 30 days.
 4
              MR. BLOMBERG: Yeah.
                                    This is Daniel. I think they
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    were deregistered for about a month and a half.
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              MR. CARROLL: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: And only reinstated after lawsuit was
    filed?
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              MR. BLOMBERG:
                             That's correct, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Yeah. Do you understand where the problem
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    comes in, Mr. Carroll?
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              MR. CARROLL: Well, I do understand the problem.
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    had to do -- well, it goes -- I guess I go back to the same
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    argument, which is all groups were reviewed the same fair way
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    and requested to file compliance, and InterVarsity at some point
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    essentially refused.
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              THE COURT: Okay. But so did other organizations that
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    were non-religious, and you let them be registered, including
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    after your second round of reviews. Correct?
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              MR. CARROLL: No. Well, okay. I mean, if you're
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    going to talk about the musical groups and athletic sports
22
    clubs, perhaps.
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              THE COURT: Well, what about things like the Iowa
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    National Lawyers Guild or the University's College of
25
    Dentistry's programs or the Tau Sigma Military Dental Club?
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mean, these aren't athletic groups or singing groups, although, frankly, that doesn't excuse things. What about sororities and fraternities? There's a whole lot, a whole lot -- Women in Science and Engineering, Iowa Edge student organizations.

There's a whole lot of organizations that the University allowed to continue being registered student organizations that have equally noncompliant portions of --

MR. CARROLL: No. They --

THE COURT: -- their constitutions.

MR. CARROLL: I'm sorry. They are in compliance. So I'll just use the example Iowa Women in Science, which is from the engineering college. To be a member, you don't have to be a woman. You have to support the mission of supporting women in science.

THE COURT: How is that different than the statement of faith?

MR. CARROLL: Well, it's not quite different. What the difference is, we're -- InterVarsity was basically saying if you don't believe in our faith, you can't be a member. You don't have to be a female to be in the -- I'll just shorten it to engineering women, okay?

You don't have to be a female to be in that organization as long as you support the mission, and in the statement of faith for InterVarsity, you have to believe in the absolute mission.

And the only mission in, like, engineering is I hope you're a

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    good engineer. I mean --
              THE COURT: What about Love Works?
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              MR. CARROLL: Well, I'll admit that's a challenge.
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   But Love Works, you know, it became kind of a -- I'm not even
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 5
    sure it exists anymore, to be honest with you, because I don't
 6
    think they --
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             MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, could I interject? With Love
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   Works --
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              MR. CARROLL: You don't need -- no. You're not an
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    attorney of record.
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              THE COURT: I need to know who was speaking for the
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    transcript. Can you tell me who was just speaking that
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   Mr. Carroll --
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             MR. LEVIN: Sorry, Your Honor. That was --
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              THE COURT: Go ahead.
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             MR. LEVIN: -- Nathan Levin.
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              THE COURT: Hi, Nathan Levin. Was that you speaking?
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              MR. LEVIN: Counsel here at University of Iowa. Yes.
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              THE COURT: And Mr. Carroll does not want you to speak
   because you're not an attorney of record?
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21
             MR. LEVIN: That's my understanding.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. CARROLL: Well, I thought those were the rules,
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   Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. You were explaining why Love Works
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was given a pass and InterVarsity was not.

MR. CARROLL: Well, they -- okay. So InterVarsity -- or Love Works wasn't given a pass.

THE COURT: It was deregistered during its review?

MR. CARROLL: It -- it essentially became defunct.

THE COURT: Where in the record is that information?

MR. CARROLL: Oh, that, I'm sorry, I'd have to -- I'd have to look it up.

THE COURT: Okay. You can submit that to me tomorrow. But go on with your argument.

MR. CARROLL: Yeah. Yeah.

So, I mean, my argument is that -- well, I'll just go back to what I said. I don't want to be just repetitive, but the argument is we weren't targeting anybody.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CARROLL: We're trying to pull -- you know, pull groups together. The chart, we're just trying to sort those charts out and just say, okay, these -- this group's on hold. I mean, and I understand what you're asking, Your Honor, about fraternities and musical groups, but we're just trying to sort them out to go we're just gonna put these groups that Iowa -- the University of Iowa recognizes as a religious group, I mean in the sense of they say it in their constitution or their application to be an RSO --

THE COURT: Okay. Love Works identifies as a

1 Christian group. 2 MR. CARROLL: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Just noting that for the record. 3 4 You still have a few minutes left. Any final arguments 5 you'd like to make or do you want to reserve that for rebuttal? MR. CARROLL: The only thing -- no. And I don't need 6 7 The only thing I would say is this claim under the rebuttal. Iowa Constitution, you know, these claims are tort claims, and 8 you have to exhaust administrative remedies to file a tort claim 10 against the State of Iowa. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. CARROLL: It's in our brief, so... 13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 14 MR. CARROLL: Thank you. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Blomberg, you still have eight minutes left. Go ahead. 16 17 MR. BLOMBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a few 18 factual matters to clean up. On Love Works, their status isn't unclear at all. In fact, 19 I went to the University's website yesterday and saw that 20 21 they're still listed as a student organization and was able to 22 download a copy of their constitution. 23 The testimony in the record in the case, which is at

Statement of Facts 322 through 329, reflects that Love Works --

that the University repeatedly reviewed and approved Love Works'

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constitution under its policy; that Love Works is now and has always been approved; that the University expressly exempted Love Works because it, in its view, provided a safe space for minorities, even though it had a statement of faith that it required its leaders to hold as a condition of being leaders.

They also admitted in those same paragraphs that Love Works never received from the University a two-week ultimatum to change its leadership rules, it was never deregistered, it never had a notice put on the University Web page stating that the group was defunct for lack of interest, all of which happened to InterVarsity.

Another student group that was specifically listed in the testimony is House of Lorde, which also the University admitted that it exempted that group even though that group requires its members to identify as black or queer and that the University was aware of those constitutional requirements and they exempted it as under its safe space exemption.

For purposes of Women in Science and Engineering, they both required their members to agree with the mission of the organization -- which, as the record reflects, numerous, dozens of organizations require that, and that's okay for secular groups, it's not okay for religious groups -- and the Women in Science and Engineering also was allowed to encourage its leaders and members to be women. So it didn't -- it wasn't an express requirement, but it was an encouragement, and that was

one of the accommodations that InterVarsity asked the University to consider and which the university rejected before it deregistered InterVarsity.

Your Honor, the argument that the University treated -even evaluated the religious groups on the same basis is
incorrect as the record reflects at paragraphs 257 through 258
that Dr. Shivers requested that Dr. Nelson and Mr. Kutcher
compile a list of religious organizations and only religious
organizations as a part of starting the review of student
organizations.

And Mr. Kutcher admitted that only religious organizations were put into a specific list by the University as part of the review. So even not only did the actual outcome of the policy discriminate against religious groups, but even the evaluation aspect of it did.

The University, when it did make the decision to deregister, it deregistered about 30 groups. The only groups, though, that were deregistered because of their leadership requirements are reflected in the record as being religious groups. The groups in addition to InterVarsity that were deregistered included the Christian Pharmacy Fellowship, the Chinese Student Christian Fellowship, the Geneva Campus Ministry, the Imam Mahdi Organization, the J. Ruben Clark Law Society, the Latter Day Saints Student Association, and the Sikh Awareness Club. That's at paragraphs 14 and 202.

In none of those circumstances did you have a comparable deregistration for other groups, secular groups, because of their leadership standards, and that's reflected in the discussion at paragraph 12 of the statement of facts.

Just a couple other matters, Your Honor. Let's see.

Just to emphasize too, while the deregistration of
InterVarsity lasted for only a month, it was severe in its
impact. It caused the group to miss meetings, it caused members
of the group to become terrified because the University is not
only their educator but also their employer. They refused to
allow their names to be associated with InterVarsity's work in
this lawsuit because they're afraid of the impact in their
future career.

The current president of the organization, Katrina Schrock, who is in the physics program and pursuing a doctorate, an exceedingly bright woman, says she's not sure that she ever would have signed up to be the president if she'd realized that this is what she was getting into, and it's been very hard for her to recruit a new president to take her place because of the stress and strain of having to go through all of this as a part of reasserting its rights.

And not only were they deregistered, but they also spent the past year being accused by the University of engaging in violations of federal civil rights law. And the University itself has -- sorry, not the University, but InterVarsity itself

has suffered the most significant drop in membership in the 22 years that the paid InterVarsity staffer, Kevin Kummer, has been there.

So this has been a very significant and very painful process for InterVarsity and also the other religious groups that were deregistered as a part of InterVarsity. I think that's what you see as well -- or are related to InterVarsity, not part of InterVarsity. You see that reflected in the amicus briefs that were filed on behalf of other religious student groups that are concerned about the impacts to them and to other groups on campus.

So, Your Honor, unless you have any other questions, I think those are the issues that I wanted to try to clear up.

THE COURT: I appreciate that.

Mr. Carroll, if you have any information in the record about Love Works' status that is different than the information provided and cited to us by Mr. Blomberg, please get that on file tomorrow.

MR. CARROLL: Yes.

THE COURT: Otherwise, we'll consider this fully submitted at close of business tomorrow and we'll get an order out as soon as possible.

Anything else for the good of the order right now on behalf of InterVarsity, Mr. Blomberg?

MR. BLOMBERG: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Carroll, on behalf of the University of Iowa? MR. CARROLL: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. We are adjourned. Thank you. (Proceedings concluded at 3:55 p.m.)

<u>C E R T I F I C A T E</u>

I, Kelli M. Mulcahy, a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Iowa and Federal Official Realtime Court Reporter in and for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, do hereby certify, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Dated at Des Moines, Iowa, this 29th day of September, 2019.

/s/ Kelli M. Mulcahy
Kelli M. Mulcahy, CSR, RDR, CRR
Federal Official Court Reporter